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Empowering the ‘Shamed’ Self: Recognition and Critical Social Work 
Summary: 
This article provides a review of the contribution of Axel Honneth’s model of recognition for 
critical social work. While Honneth’s tripartite conceptualisation of optimal identity-
formation is positively appraised, his analysis of the link between misrecognition, the 
experience of shame and eventual sense of moral outrage, is contested. Drawing on a range 
of sources, including the sociology of shame, Honneth’s ideas about the emotional 
antecedents of emancipatory action are revised to guide critical social work with 
misrecognised service users.  
Findings: 
The intellectual background to Honneth’s recognition model, emanating from leading 
German philosophers, is described and its application to social work set out. Even so, 
Honneth’s model is found to be deficient in one primary regard: its assumption about the 
emotional antecedents to quests for withheld recognition is misapprehended. In particular, 
the argument in this article is that the ubiquitous emotion of shame, which Honneth argues 
flows from misrecognition, must be carefully addressed through the medium of relationship, 
otherwise it might lead to repressed shame and frustrated attempts at social struggle. To 
this end, a social work process is delineated for dealing with shame, following episodes of 
misrecognition. 
Applications: 
Honneth’s model of recognition, along with revised ideas about how to recognise and 
manage shame, is incorporated into a conceptual framework for critical social work practice. 
With this renewed understanding of the impact of shame, following misrecognition, social 
workers should be better equipped conceptually to enable service users to take action for 
empowerment. 
Key words: critical social work, recognition, shame, empowerment, rights, theory, social 
justice 
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Introduction 
This article critically appraises Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition (1996) and its 
implications for social work practice. Honneth’s ideas have radically challenged notions of 
social justice, empowerment and human well-being within contemporary social, political 
and moral theory. As an influential heir to his mentors in the Frankfurt School, he continues 
to develop a corpus of thought concentrating on the subject’s struggle to attain a 
wholesome identity; that is, a way of being attuned with oneself so that self-respect, self-
confidence and self-esteem flourish. The subject’s experience of positive recognition from 
others is the axial hub around which these three aspects of self-relation turn. Moreover, 
Honneth sees recognition as the fundamental, overarching moral category guiding theory-
building and politicised praxis aimed at securing social justice. 
The social work profession and academy should, therefore, attempt to make sense of 
Honneth’s substantial intellectual achievement, test its relevance and helpfulness for 
practice, and add critical insights to make it more pertinent to the needs of service users. 
This inquiry is urgent because social work must theorise the interconnection between the 
‘personal’ and the ‘political’ in order to explain events in social life (Lens, 2001; Andersen, 
2013; Gray & Webb, 2013). Theory has to be conceptually sufficient so it can offer an 
understanding of ‘private ills’ (for example, forms of psychological suffering) and their link 
with ‘public issues’ (for example, discrimination, injustice, and relations of asymmetrical 
power). The bifuraction between the psychological and political realms of social work 
practice in western States has remained contentious and insufficiently explored, particularly 
in the neo-liberal age of globalisation, xenophobia, near imminent environmental 
catastrophe and the melt-down of turbo-capitalist markets (Ferguson, 2013). Simply put, 
the notion of recognition needs to move beyond a much popularised and vaunted term in 
the social science lexicon, to a psycho-social construct enabling service users to take action 
for empowerment. This denotes a process of change whereby sub-altern groups move from 
being passive spectators to engaged activists in order to enhance control of their lives and 
social situations (Mullaly, 2007).  
In this context, social work is a unique profession because it intervenes in the interstices 
between personal lives, civic status (and its subordination) and the social world. ‘Thus, it is 
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concerned with the social and personal; the psychological and the public, the individual and 
(original emphasis) the collective; with the self and agencies affecting it’ (Croft and 
Beresford, 2008, p. 400). Social workers not only advocate for service users with senior 
managers within their organisations (in order to canvass resources) but also respond to 
psychological loss, crisis and change in specialist settings such as palliative care and, more 
generally, transitions throughout the human lifecycle. Critical theory helps to make these 
interventions psychologically, culturally and politically sensitive. For example, social workers 
need to understand the rampant politicisation of migrants and refugees as it has a 
significant bearing on issues of misrecognition, inclusion, participation and integration in 
society. It is not enough to practice traditional casework with these groupings: increasingly 
social work needs to respond at the level of policy advocacy, research and public education. 
In all of this, social work faces a conflict between its core values (such as respect) and the 
political ideologies underpinning western, neo-liberal States. Recognition theory provides a 
lens for social workers and service users to examine these conflicts and determine ‘what is 
going on’, ‘what is to be done’, and ‘how is it to be done’. Such is the politics of social work 
recognition. 
As to the structure of the article, I summarise, firstly, Honneth’s work on the theme of 
recognition and describe its resuscitation of a cardinal permise in Hegelian philosophy: the 
intersubjective nature of selfhood.  Next, consideration is given to the social work 
academy’s growing interest in the recognition paradigm, noting some positive appraisal but 
also clear-sighted critique. With these foundations in place, I highlight a central gap in 
Honneth’s model. This refers to his assumption that experiences of disrespect, engendering 
the emotion of shame, lead ipso facto to social struggle aimed at seeking withheld 
recognition. It is argued that a reworked understanding of the psychology of shame in 
Honneth’s work is necessary if service users are to make any recognizable headway in 
connecting their assaulted identities with attempts to take collective action in the outside 
world. In other words, the translation of experiences of disrespect (and its correlate of 
shame) to group empowerment, user involvement and self-advocacy, is one that can be 
hampered by unconscious defence mechanisms leading to repressed shame.  
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Critical social work has a vital role to play here in addressing how emancipatory action might 
be curtailed by this psychological reaction. For example, The Disability Rights movement  in 
the UK has not only re-defined our understanding of what types of services should be 
provided but also who should provide them (Coulshed, 2006). Independent living, person-
centred planning, co-production, personalisation and direct payments are innovations in the 
UK that flow from a progressive, social model of disability. This movement has rightly 
highlighted that service users, themselves, can be service providers. Yet, in the process of 
empowering service users to take on such a role, past experiences of psychological shame, 
stigma, humiliation and misrecognition may need to be worked through as they can lead to 
psychological and social withdrawal. In effect, they are often barriers to change. It is not 
purely an outward matter of advocating, commissioning, and negotiating: social workers 
need to tune-in and demonstrate accurate empathy for psychological experiences of 
disrespect. This takes us to Honneth’s central propositions about identity-formation and 
social change. 
Honneth’s Model of Recognition 
One striking feature of Honneth’s output is its self-consciously and painstakingly reflective 
vigilance in testing and reworking its philosophical claims. In his magnum opus, The Struggle 
for Recognition (1996), Honneth brought together, succinctly and coherently, a range of 
inter-related ideas forged out of extensive inquiries into the nature of human development 
in the context of unfolding historical social relations. Capturing philosophical themes, 
intuitions and musings, as part of an earlier fifteen year inquiry, this culminating text 
remained true to the leitmotif of the Frankfurt School: to maintain a strong unity between 
theory and praxis. A golden thread of inquiry underpinned this work knitting together the 
thoughts of a number of intellectual luminaries including Hegel, Feuerbach, Fichte, Mead 
and Habermas. The ideas emanating from this genealogy are traced briefly before outlining 
the centre-piece of Honneth’s thinking: his tripartite model of identity-formation. 
Honneth, at a preliminary stage in his thinking, was greatly inspired by Georg Hegel’s early 
Jena writings (1979). Hegel was the first major philosopher to evince an inter-subjectivist 
paradigm and link it with social norms. He believed human identity flourished in the context 
of social relationships characterised by exchange and reciprocity. In doing so, he 
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emphasised the sociality of the human subject. Even prior to the distinction between one 
person and another, there existed, according to Hegel, a primordial bond, or social 
symbiosis, between them. Hence, inter-subjectivity was viewed as an a priori phenomenon. 
Here, we came across the idea of a fundamental unity between people, one that even 
preceded their understanding of themselves as separate beings. Moreover, human 
engagement reached an ethical apex when subjects recognised, not only their inter-
connectedness, but their joint value. This view of the primacy of social life was in marked 
contrast to reductionist conceptions of society as an aggregate of individuals caught in a 
Hobessian ‘war-of-all-against-all’ or a Machiavellian quest for narcissistic, self-preservation. 
Honneth’s intellectual journey was further animated by the work of Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1986). For this German philosopher, the subject was a sensuous being endowed with 
corporeality – or a physical presence, which interacted with other embodied subjects in the 
social sphere. The use of the word sensuality referred to the subject’s feelings, sentiments, 
and visceral intuitions. Upon entering the social world, the subject opened out to it and 
hence engaged in some form of rich inter-change with others. We were not rational 
automatons, argued Feuerbach, but rather beings of the heart as well as the mind. When 
the wordly winds of gain and loss, fame and fortune, pleasure and pain, and praise and 
blame blowed unpredictably through a person’s life, they were inevitably met with an 
emotional response. In particular, the subject experienced hurt, shame and outrage when 
humiliated. From hurt came an instinctive impulse to act to restore a tainted identity. As 
such, human praxis was, for Feuerbach, a kind of emancipatory sensualism following 
assaults on our identity. The oppressed, thrust forward by emotional outrage and 
condemnation of their treatment, became political actors seeking recompense through a 
moral grammar of social struggle.  
Feuerbach rooted these conceptions in an anthropocentric paradigm of philosophical 
anthropology. It suggested we developed a reflective identity through social interaction to 
become moral beings. Furthermore, the social aspect of our being was so ineluctably 
anchored in our needs that, to disregard this dimension of human life, was to show 
disrespect. The subject’s needs for positive acknowledgement were an omnipresent reality 
across cultures and historical epochs, forming a moral substratum of experience. When 
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need was threatened through acts of misrecognition, a space was created for a normative 
critique of those breaches of inter-subjectivity.  
Honneth was also influenced by Johann Fichte (2000). The latter posited that self-
consciousness was formed out of a circular, reciprocal reaction with another’s 
consciousness. This notion mirrored closely the central premise underpinning symbolic 
interactionism, a sociological theory developed by the American pragmatist thinker, George 
Herbert Mead (1967). Borrowing from Fichte and Mead, Honneth refined and developed his 
theory of recognition according to the premise that ‘I can produce in myself the reaction 
that my actions are likely to evoke in the person with whom I am talking’. Thus, both 
philosophers articulated something essential about social life and moral behaviour: our 
ability to perspective-take with others in order to influence their actions and maintain a 
social bond. We developed a capacity as a species to carry out an internal dialogue enabling 
us to reflect on what others, and society at large, expected of us. So, for Honneth, formative 
processes in the recognition of the other involved role-taking and internal conversations 
about expectations of behaviour.  
Yet, Honneth was clear that role-taking was not just a process of internal, monological 
dialogue with oneself; more than that, it involved communication with significant people. 
Jürgen Habermas (1986) emphasised this facet of social life when he established the 
conditions for egalitarian communication: a situation where speakers listened to each other 
and attempted to understand what was being said in order to reach a consensus. He termed 
this communicative action and contrasted it with a conversation where speakers were 
strategic in intent, using power to manipulate the discourse in accordance with pre-
determined ends. Honneth underscored the significance of communication but argued, 
contra Habermas, it was not the crucial engine driving emancipation. Coming from a post-
linguistic stance, he saw the impetus for change in terms of claims for rightful identity in the 
widest sense possible. 
Synthesising these grounding insights from various German philosophers, Honneth 
articulated the quintessential dimensions of recognition in social life. Formatively, they fell 
under three headings, namely recognition of the subject’s: (a) need for love and care (b) 
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rights as a human being and (c) strengths or contribution to a community. Table 1 (below) 
sets out these dimensions of recognition, their sources and psycho-social connotation. 
PLACE TABLE ONE HERE 
Self-confidence was developed in the infant by primary caretakers showing acts of love and 
care. Honneth looked to Winnicott’s object-relations theory (1971) to substantiate this form 
of recognition. Winnicott suggested that the very young infant experienced a symbiotic 
union with her mother accompanied by an undifferentiated sense of self. Through ‘good 
enough’ mothering, or maternal recognition, this profound dependence gradually lessened 
as the infant became more aware of her nascent identity. Any separation anxiety would be 
contained psychologically by the available and sensitive mother, enabling the child to 
develop ontological trust, leave the ‘secure base’ of protected care, and explore the social 
world. The movement from complete dependence following birth, to relative inter-
dependence as a mature, functioning adult, challenged Freud’s view that human 
development was primarily a product of intra-psychic processes forged on repressed, 
libidinal needs. The child’s inner working model, embracing the perception of self and 
others, could be threatened, however, by acts of child abuse leading to impaired self-
confidence in later life.  
Self-respect, by way of contrast, occurred as a result of a different type of recognition, one 
lying in society’s attribution of diverse human rights to each and every citizen. The individual 
was entitled to freedom of expression, the right to vote, to take part in an assembly, to own 
property – all indicative of the great liberal tradition of rights. But more than that, 
respecting the other meant she should not have to endure the privations of material 
inequities and impecunious hardship nor suffer xenophobic discrimination against her 
cultural identity. To achieve a sense of full self-realisation, subjects should also be accorded 
rights as full participants in the democratic polis. They should be empowered to take an 
active role in deliberating on policy, law and statue rather than being thrust into the role of 
passive recipients of centralised decrees. To return to Mead and symbolic interactionism, if 
role-taking was a deeply ingrained anthropological fact, an irrepressible human need, it 
must surely have a normative content pivoting on a consideration of the other’s person’s 
rights in the situation. To ground this point, the trinity of ‘rights, respect and role-taking’ 
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reverberates strongly with social work approaches to young offenders. Yet, in some social 
systems regulating this area, a justice paradigm has prevailed over a welfare one. In the 
former, risk-analysis occludes needs-assessment and punishment overturns restorative care 
(Carr, 2012). When this occurs, role-taking is attenuated as insufficient consideration is 
given to the fact that many young offenders come from impoverished backgrounds. 
However, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the best 
interests of children should be a primary consideration dominating all actions. 
Self-esteem, according to Honneth, came by recognising a person possessed unique 
strengths or talents. People were situated in different social networks and communities 
where they could contribute to the well-being of others. In previous times social standing 
had been tied to the group to which one belonged. In the modern age, it was linked to an 
individual’s achievement. Regardless of the period, having this contribution recognised by 
social networks built pride and competence. Strengths could be vocational in nature, or 
reflect prowess in sports, or educational attainment, or musical flair. To be competent in at 
least one area, and to have this recognised, enhanced resilience. It accentuated one’s ability 
to deal with stress. Educational achievement could activate positive chain reactions or at 
least divert negatives ones. We know about the value of recognising skills in young people in 
the education system as a way of enhancing their capacity to ‘bounce back’ from adversity 
(Ungar, 2004). Self-efficacy was associated with this resilience. In contrast, misrecognition of 
one’s contribution to the community undermined esteem and, with it, dignity. This linkage 
between resilience and community is taken up by Ungar’s (2012) path-breaking 
international research. For him, building resilience is an ecologically complex and multi-
dimensional process. Moreover, it is a process that draws on resources in both the 
individual and the environment. This assertion complements Honneth’s stress on the 
domain of social networks. Ungar’s findings also connect with recognition theory when he 
reports that services must be delivered in a respectful way, paying attention to the young 
person’s rights, providing care, and prioritising the person over bureaucracy.  
Recognition and Social Work 
Honneth’s work has received limited attention by the social work academy. That said, two 
authors have formatively evaluated its contribution to social work. They are Paul Michael 
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Garrett (2010) and Stephen Webb (2010). Both eschewed the tripartite model though the 
latter was somewhat more positive in his overall view. Garrett pointed to the model’s 
supposed ‘psychologisation’ of human problems and reductionist focus on micro 
encounters. Both referred to its conceptual limitations when it came to the question of the 
redistribution of wealth. Their concerns reflected Nancy Fraser’s (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) 
enduring polemic against Honneth. Fraser argued Honneth’s three spheres of recognition 
explained cultural injustice but not exploitation in the sphere of political economy. 
Cleavages in class, inequalities in living standards, and material disadvantage, were under-
theorised, it was claimed. For Fraser, the redress to neoliberalism lay not just in the 
restoration of wounded cultural identities but also in the reinstatement of the subject’s 
status in social and economic life and her parity with others to participate equally in social 
situations. Fraser’s argument carried some weight given the reality of oppressive class 
systems under neo-liberalism and the need to give redistribution a firmer footing in 
economic policy.  
However, this critique did not give sufficient credence to Honneth’s later work (2012) where 
the recognition concept was extended more visibly to political and economic institutions, 
their exploitation of the worker, and the social impact of working conditions. In making 
these shifts towards an understanding of political-economy, Honneth defined a leftist-
Hegelian critique of liberalism. With this understanding, he extrapolated the third sphere of 
recognition to a subject’s contribution within the field of labour. A person’s experience of 
the labour market, to quote Honneth, ‘must remain categorically embedded in moral 
experiences to such a degree that its role in obtaining social recognition does not disappear 
from view’ (2007, p. 75). Child rearing, social care within institutions supporting vulnerable 
people, and so called ‘housework’, were all examples of realms of labour disrespected by 
modern society. The carer’s rank in these areas was considerably devalued. The impact of 
unemployment, on mental health and family well-being, must also be viewed as a form of 
societal disrespect. For example, a long-term, loyal, hard-working employee is suddenly 
made redundant as a result of a competitive take-over of the firm for which he works. His 
subsequent depression at losing a valued role has manifest implications for his family. His 
children suffer, not only due to the loss of income, but also because of the psychological loss 
 
 
9 
of their father. Thus, the capricious nature of the market weaves its way into the private 
sphere of family life, impacting on child welfare and ostensibly igniting a negative chain 
reaction in personal psycho-biographies.  
Other social work commentators, including this author (Houston, 2013), have been more 
approving of recognition theory. Thus, Froggett (2004) drew on research conducted in a 
cross-professional community and healthy living centre. The practice of inter-personal 
recognition, she found, fostered creative forms of expression (such as the use of art and 
drama) and personal development. The recognition principle was seen as fundamental to 
developing creativity within staff and service users. By gaining confidence through creative 
expression, users were empowered to think about instances of misrecognition in wider 
domains of their lives. In a different vein, Marthinsen and Skjefstad (2011) gave credence to 
the recognition construct in their empirical research of a social work programme in Norway. 
The social workers were able to develop the service users’ self-confidence by actively 
recognising their strengths. One important consequence of this stance was the development 
of occupational skills in the long-term unemployed.  Cortis (2007), correspondingly, 
discovered Honneth’s recognition-theoretic resonated strongly with the suffering described 
by parents in a case study exploring family support services. Commenting on Honneth’s 
tripartite model of love, rights and strengths, she said: ‘These categories give voice to the 
social suffering of users in the study, and meaningfully capture the outcomes they 
experienced by using family services’ (p. 257). 
Jull (2009) took up a different theme by presenting the norm of recognition in social work as 
a foil to institutional practices underpinned by negative judgements of service users. For Jull, 
judgement leads to disrespectful practice. This idea that institutions present barriers to 
recognition was also mirrored in Filsinger’s (2003) attempt to apply Honneth’s three forms 
of practical self-relation to psychosocial practice with people with a learning disability. 
Institutional regimes, it was argued, can present sources of misrecognition as witnessed in 
‘indignities, disregard and restrictions to autonomy’ (p. 21).  
We can build on these sources to link Honneth’s three limbs of recognition with related 
approaches to social work practice (see Table 2). 
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PLACE TABLE 2 HERE 
Recognition as love/care centrally finds a home in relationship-based social work (Turney, 
2012). The development and maintenance of a therapeutic alliance with the service user, 
where care is shown, sustains and nurtures relationship - even in contexts where the need 
for control is also present. Caring, relational social work stands in marked contrast to the 
cold, rational feel of some bureaucratic, welfare interventions. Indeed, Ferguson and 
Woodward (2009) argued relationship-based practice was a modern antidote to 
bureaucracy and managerialism. Computerised systems, audit checklists, actuarial, risk-
averse schedules, sometimes displace the person, not recognising identity needs. Our self-
image depends on how other people react to us, what they reflect back through their facial 
expression, vocal tone and demeanour. For Honneth, consciousness cannot be separated 
from social context. It follows, therefore, that social work can be conceptualised as a form 
of symbolic interaction. A social worker has a major responsibility to cultivate positive 
thoughts of self-relation in service users by focusing on the quality of the social interaction 
within professional encounters. Positive interaction is the process by which the capacity to 
think about self is both developed and expressed. In this medium, a social worker can 
counter the effects of stigma and labelling. Commensurate with this focus on the symbolic 
world of the service user, is the requirement to understand how relationship affects intra-
psychic development. To reiterate, Honneth drew on Winnicott’s ideas concerning the 
importance of object-relations for the developing self. Attachment theory (Golding, 2008) 
embraces this perspective with its focus on how the ‘inner working model’ develops, 
defence mechanisms operate and attachment patterns unfold throughout the lifecourse. 
Recognition, in the form of identifying strengths within others, is mirrored in strengths-
based social work where the onus is to empower service users. This approach builds on the 
premise people have the innate capacity to reflect, grow, adapt to their circumstances, 
assimiliate new information and utilise inner resources to address challenges in life. It is 
antithetical to a deficit-led model which negates self-esteem. Moreover, for Honneth, this 
form of recognition demands a social medium: a group or network which values the subject 
and the contribution she makes to the collective sphere. Community social work and 
ecological perspectives adhere to this fundamental principle (in different ways). In doing so, 
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they take account of how contrasting social systems - micro, meso and macro - nurture an 
individual’s strengths and their potential. As I have reported elsewhere (Houston & Dolan, 
2008), the assessment of social support is intrinsic here and might include the provision of a 
mentor to enhance a person’s skills. Providing support to another person is the sine qua non 
of recognition. 
Acknowledging and respecting the other’s rights, is reflected in rights-based social work 
practice (Ife, 2012). The discourse on human rights occupies one of the most emotive and 
contested positions in contemporary socio-political debates. It lies at the epicentre of social 
work and its codes of practice, particularly at a time when the misrecognition of socio-
cultural identities is to the fore in many countries, and structural cleavages between rich 
and poor families are becoming increasingly apparent. Given the reality of these challenges, 
Honneth’s recognition framework takes on a particular purchase, because it moves beyond 
a conception of rights as abstract entitlements to one concerned with an enhancement of 
personal identity. Re-formulated in this way, the law, through the medium of respectful 
relations, has the power to create emotional well-being. Hence, the person is not a virtual 
actor but rather a sensuous being dependent on daily acts of respect. Human rights must be 
connected with real-life, embodied people who feel pain. These ontological premises 
sharpen empathy for service users making it more percipient. 
Rights-based social work can also be aligned, under a broad canvass, with other radical 
forms of practice such as critical social work (Allan et al, 2009), structural social work 
(Mullaly, 2007) and political social work (Webb & Gray, 2014). These approaches share a 
common commitment to redress social inequality and relationships based on asymmetrical 
power. Whether of a modernist hue (where material conditions are to the fore), or 
postmodernist complexion (focusing on the celebration of difference and diveristy), the aim 
is to foster social change through transformative practice. Honneth’s model of social justice 
provides a new angle on critical social work through the philosophical anthropology of the 
person presented earlier. Stated in another way, it is not always clear what ontological 
assumptions of the person underpin the various forms of critical social work and anti-
oppressive practice. It is not always apparent what view is taken on identity-formation and 
the nature of social interaction. The pathologies of capitalist society must be understood in 
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terms of their effects on the person, first and foremost, how they dismantle a person’s 
being-in-the-world and psychological constitution. For Honneth, the prime mover in neo-
liberal de-humanization is not instrumental rationality (as stated by the early Frankfurt 
School theorists) nor distorted communication (as argued by Habermas). Modern social 
theory, the well-spring of contemporary, critical social work, must relocate its analysis in the 
structural conditions of reciprocal recognition. In this context, Honneth is suggesting that 
the intersubjective nature of human identity can act as the fillip to critical practice. 
Recognition, in this formulation, becomes the normative foundation for a new critical 
theory of the person and society. 
In reviewing the above categories, it is important to state that, in practice, the different 
forms of recognition are interlacing. That is, love and care underpin a rights-based approach 
and a strengths-orientation. When practicing community social work, we are implicitly 
acknowledging rights of citizenship. An empowering social work response will, most likely, 
show all three forms of recognition. In the domain of mental health, for example, social 
workers are required to show care when addressing severe mental distress; reduce social 
isolation through creating supporting social networks; and uphold rights when advocating 
for users caught in the labyrinth of the psychiatric system. In mental health social work, 
empowerment may also take the form of supporting the development of service user, 
consumer and survivor perspectives. The following quote from Honneth should enliven 
these perspectives: ‘because engaging in political struggle publicly demonstrates the ability 
that was hurtfully disrespected, this participation restores a bit of the individual’s lost self-
respect’ (1996, p. 164).  
Critical Social Work, Disrespect and Shame  
At this stage we need to enlarge the analysis by challenging a core premise in Honneth’s 
theorization of social change: that is, that moral experiences of disrespect should be viewed, 
unproblematically, as the driving engine for demands for recognition. Contra Honneth, 
disrespect may often create emotional blockages to change, inertia or activate the flight 
mechanism. To avail of Honneth’s path-breaking contribution, critical social work must re-
work his ideas on this theme by appraising how subjects react emotionally to experiences of 
disrespect. 
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According to Honneth (1996), disrespect can be shown in a number of ways. First, the body 
can be violated as in acts of physical abuse, sexual abuse and torture. These acts represent 
the most fundamental forms of degradation because they result in severe humiliation and 
shame. It is not only the physical pain that is felt but also ‘the feeling of being defensively at 
the mercy of another subject, to the point of feeling that one has been depived of reality’ (p. 
132). There is lasting damage to one’s confidence and trust in others. In all of this, the 
subject has lost autonomous control of her body and, furthermore, experiences a kind of 
psychological death. A second form of disrespect, argues Honneth, comes from the denial of 
a person’s inviolable rights. As a consequence, one’s personal autonomy is affected; one 
also loses the status of a fully-fledged citizen endowed with moral entitlements to take part 
in social interaction. This situation results in a loss of face and moral self-respect, with its 
accompanying shame, because the subject is no longer recognised as capable of forming 
moral judgements. For Honneth, the experience can represent a ‘social death’. Finally, 
according to Honneth, the third face of disrespect reveals itself when one’s contribution to 
the community is not acknowledged. This omission impacts negatively on status, self-worth 
and self-esteem. When one’s abilities are not recognised by the social group to which one is 
affiliated, it leads to a sense of social ostracism – a lack of connection with networks that are 
meant to validate one’s place in the established, social order. Using metaphorical terms, 
Honneth argues that cultural denigration leads to psychic scars and injuries.  
To reiterate, these three forms of disrespect, for Honneth, lead to humiliation, denigration 
and shame, endangering human identity much like the way a pernicious infection threatens 
bodily health.  However, unlike Hegel and Mead, who failed to address the societal 
implications of disrespect, Honneth saw shame as the prime mover in motivating a subject 
to engage in social struggle or conflict. He therefore seized upon this missing link connecting 
psychological suffering to pragmatic action. Feeling ashamed propelled one into a quest for 
the denied social recognition that sustained human identity. In his inimitable style, Honneth 
put the point as follows: ‘in the context of the emotional responses associated with shame, 
the experience of being disrespected can become the motivational impetus for a struggle 
for recognition. For it is only by regaining the possibility of active conduct that individuals 
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can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of 
humiliation’ (p. 138).  
At this juncture, what are we to make of Honneth’s thoughts concerning the moral and 
psychological antecedents of social struggle? While the tripartite model of identity 
formation has much relevance to social work, as argued above, his assertion that shame 
unproblematically generates political struggle is naïve and must surely confound anti-
oppressive practice rather than enrich it. Phenomenological, sociological and 
psychoanalytical evidence (considered below) presents a different set of findings regarding 
the psycho-social dynamics of shame. Attempts to translate shame into user-empowerment 
may well flounder unless this is understood. 
Shame, as an emotion in human life, has received increasing attention in a range of 
literature – both fictional and academic. From a psychoanalytical perspective, Helen Lewis 
(1971) discovered shame was ubiquitous when analysing numerous verbatim transcripts of 
psychotherapeutic sessions with her clients. In fact, the experience of shame was much 
more prevalent than other emotional reactions. Like Honneth, Lewis saw shame as 
quintessentially a reaction to a disrupted social bond – when one became disconnected 
from both understanding and being understood by another. However, it was often 
suppressed or by-passed. Quite assuredly, it did not lead neatly to Honneth’s emancipatory 
praxis.  
The emotion of shame has also received notable coverage from a sociological perspective.  
Georg Simmel (1904) examined how people needed to express themselves creatively but 
feared the consequences of departing from social conventions. To do so, would be to invoke 
shame. Alternatively, for Charles Cooley (1922), shame was a by-product of self-reflection: 
wondering what the other was thinking about one’s actions. Being conscious of how we 
appeared to others, through a ‘looking-glass mirror’, could either lead to shame or pride 
depending on whether one felt judged or validated. Thus, these emotions were the 
outcome of a self-monitoring process in the form of an inner dialogue linked to social 
interaction. Cooley’s thoughts in this regard influenced Irving Goffman’s (2005) idea that 
face saving overtures (in order to ‘cut a good figure’), and deferential demeanour, were 
integral to the interaction order. In effect, they were designed to fend off rejection and 
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embarrasment. A person experiencing the latter emotion was strongly motivated to re-
establish the social bond, to be relieved from the crippling impact of shame. This was a 
somewhat different conclusion to the one drawn by Honneth.    
The sociologist, Norbert Elias, made a novel contribution to this area. In his land-mark 
exploration of the civilizing process through pre-modern and modern times (2000), he 
linked the experience of shame with departures from ‘manners’ in social life. Simply put, a 
civilized person must abide by socially approved etiquette. Children had been socialised into 
this rubric from an early age and with it came ever decreasing shame thresholds, making 
shame more ubiquitous. Yet, for Elias, as with Lewis, shame was often a hidden experience, 
one not easily identified nor vented. It could not be viewed automatically as an inexorable 
source of politicised contestation. 
The sociologist, Thomas Scheff (2000), acknowledged the salience of this body of work on 
shame. Like Honneth, he believed human beings were intrinsically social in nature. Indeed, 
he argued we were ineluctably driven to maintain the social bond with others. Preserving 
social connectedness necessitated, though, that we adhered to a ‘deference-emotion 
system’. In other words, actors strived to maintain social attunement with each other by 
submitting to idealised, social expectations. If we failed to live up to these expectations, the 
emotion of shame often appeared. Shame thus acted as a social regulator of behaviour. By 
way of contrast, when we believed we had met what was required of us, interactively, then 
pride, the converse of shame, would result with its positive ramifications for the self. 
Notably, given their ontological prominence in social interaction, Scheff argued shame and 
pride could be considered the master emotions in human life, occurring throughout many 
cultures and exhibited through historical events and artistic traditions. They were 
quintessential and ubiquitous feelings. More importantly, Scheff saw shame as often 
unacknowledged by the subject or by-passed endorsing the observations of Lewis, Goffman 
and Elias. One reason for this was that shame was recursive: it reacted back on itself, so that 
we became shamed about feeling shame in the first place. The process could be mutually 
reinforcing and insuperably destructive, generating anger, as depicted in the figure below: 
PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE 
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As can be seen, shame commences with the perception that a bond with someone has been 
disrupted or broken. There follows negative consequences for the ‘self’. In short, self-
esteem becomes tarnished. When this occurs, a person might experience shame due to a 
negative evaluation of self. Feeling this way often produces anger, because to be 
humiliated, is a painful experience. Anger, in turn, can further disrupt the social bond 
because it can be seen as an attack on the self. The cycle mirrors Honneth’s misrecognition 
thesis up to the point when shame is experienced. For Scheff, shame then becomes a buried 
affair leading to potentially destructive cycles of anger and relational breakdown. Honneth, 
in marked contrast, presents it as an enlightening gateway to political action – given the 
right social context. However, the previously highlighted body of psychological and 
sociological work supporting Scheff’s stance is noteworthy. It questions, therefore, 
Honneth’s understanding of the psycho-dynamics of shame. That said, it is important to 
retain Honneth’s important premises on recognition and identity (outlined earlier) and yet 
accommodate Scheff’s insights. Such an undertaking might provide critical social work 
practice with a deeper understanding of the inter-connection between misrecognition, 
shame and empowerment. 
To make this inter-connection more visible, I contend shame might be approached in a 
social work encounter as follows (see Figure 2 below): 
PLACE FIGURE 2 HERE 
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It is axiomatic that a caring, holding relationship, where a therapeutic alliance is struck, 
offers the best medium for helping someone address disturbing emotions such as shame 
and guilt. Indeed, this is a cardinal principle of social work (Turney, 2012) and is synonymous 
with what Ferguson terms ‘intimate practice’ (2013). It also primarily reflects Honneth’s first 
limb of recognition – the need for love and care. Crucially, this relationship should be devoid 
of negative judgement. From the security of this connection, a service user might begin to 
explore episodes in her life when she had been misrecognised and the feelings engendered. 
The experience of (buried) shame may be present and identified through shame markers 
such as blushing, negative self-talk, the pain of feeling different to others, a leap to anger, or 
a deep sense of embarrassment. The antecedents to such inner distress might be 
considered in terms of Honneth’s three forms of misrecognition: withholding care to a 
person, denying her rights, or failing to acknowledge her strengths. Identifying and exploring 
shame, bringing repressed feelings into conscious awareness, harrowing as it may be, can 
effect catharsis and assist in managing the emotion. Inner mindfulness of the impact of 
shame on one’s thoughts and bodily states can lead to the technique of gently ‘letting-go’ of 
the experience instead of investing in repression or its ostensible transmutation into anger. 
Social workers can help at this point to reverse shame to restore pride by enacting 
Honneth’s three limbs of identity-formation with the service-user: recognising the person’s 
need for care and solicitude, her rights and strengths. By regaining some sense of pride, 
service-users are better placed to take action for empowerment – seeking the lost 
recognition they deserved without having to also deal with the debilitating effects of shame 
hampering the empowerment process. 
The various components of Honneth’s model of recognition, and the re-worked view on 
shame based on the work of Scheff and others, can be collated into a conceptual framework 
for social work practice (see Table 3 below). 
PLACE TABLE 3 HERE 
A framework such as this can be used to enable service users to explore experiences of 
recognition and misrecognition in their life-pathways and the presence of pride or shame. It 
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also provides the social worker with an understanding of what methods, skills and 
approaches are appropriate to address different forms of misrecognition. When shame is 
identified, a shame-sensitive form of social work practice, depicted in figure 2 above, can be 
employed to help ameliorate it and instil pride. For service users, the latter orientation is 
more conducive to examining the impact of the domains of the ‘personal’ and the ‘political’ 
on their lives compared with the repressive effects of shame. In doing so, the framework 
also enables users to take action for empowerment. Here, the social worker must use her 
relationship with the service user to recognise the latter’s worth, to show care, acknowledge 
rights and locate strengths. Relationship-based social work, reflecting the philosophical 
anthropology of Honneth and his intellectual precursors, is the medium par excellence for 
growth and change.  
The framework also sensitizes social workers to some of the fundamental psycho-social 
dynamics underpinning oppression and connects this understanding with different types of 
anti-oppressive and rights-based interventions. In doing so, it acts as a conceptual tool 
enabling students to reflect when on placement; social workers to tune-in to a new referral; 
and social work academics to consider some of the essential elements of a value-led 
curriculum. Moreover, it can be used to undergird anti-oppressive supervision moving 
beyond a bureaucratic, risk-averse, check-list model to put the ‘social’ back into social work. 
Hence, supervisor and supervisee could consider how recognition and misrecognition have 
played out in the lives of service users and how the ‘ethics of recognition’ ought to shape 
case assessment, planning, decision-making, management and evaluation. The examination 
of care and control conflicts, and work with reluctant and resistant young people and adults, 
takes on a particular purchase when examined through the lens of recognition theory and 
the disabling effects of shame. Negative reactions from service users may well reflect a 
central feeling that they have been disrespected in some fundamental way. A resistant 
young person may have had a life-time of abuse and denigration in his family and 
institutional care contrary to Honneth’s first limb of identity-formation. The lens of 
recognition gets to the heart of the matter. 
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Conclusion 
German philosophy contains a fecund vein of ontological insights about the human 
condition, the pre-requisites for personal identity and, most importantly, human flourishing. 
The contours of this school of thought have been traced noting Hegel’s foundational 
proposition that our sense of self is quintessentially a ‘social’ affair. Honneth’s development 
of this corpus of thought, addressing particularly our practical relation-to-self, has been 
discussed noting the salience for social work of the three limbs of optimal identity-
formation, namely recognition in terms of care, rights, and strengths. However, sociological 
insights about shame, as an emotional response to misrecognition, are at odds with 
Honneth’s premise that it is the antecedent to social action; it is here that Scheff’s work has 
been brought to bear to rework this aspect of the recognition model. With this renewed 
understanding of the impact of shame, social workers are better equipped conceptually to 
empower service users to make the link between misrecognition and acts of resistance or 
contestation. It is the attainment of pride in oneself which activates a belief that change to 
the prevailing social order is possible. Critical social work practice is quintessentially a 
response to human injustice and oppression that builds from a deep ontological 
understanding of the self, hurt, humiliation, shame and also the conditions required for 
optimal self-confidence, self-esteem and self-respect. Fuelled by a philosophical 
anthropology of the self, social workers can develop renewed insights into the fundamental 
nature of social ‘being’ realising that the ‘I’ is in the ‘We’ and vice-versa (Honneth, 2013). 
Arguably, this philosophical insight ought to unite different forms of radical, rights-based 
and anti-oppressive approaches in social work. 
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